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By G. P. Haviland andG. F. Purkey
Aeronautical SystemsDivision, U.S.Air Force
United States
SUMMARY
The United StatesAir Force haspublisheda documententitled, "Aircraft Struc-
tural Integrity Program" (ASIP). Onephaseof the program is concernedwith the
fatigue life certification of all types of military aircraft. The documentdescribes the
criteria, analyses,and tests that are necessary in order to satisfy the USAFfatigue
life requirement. The authors have notedthat somerecent andvalid criticism has
beendirected toward the document,particularly the fatigue-life requirements contained
in it. This paper proposessomechangesbasedon surveys conductedin the United
States andabroadas well as somerecent systems' experience. The surveys covered
both military andcivilian organizations. The paper contains the fatigue certification
casehistories of selected military andcommercial aircraft. The designdevelopment
element tests, preproduction designverification tests, andfull-scale fatigue tests of
each are described. The paper concludeswith a brief status report on the revisions to
the MIL-A-008860 series specifications.
INTRODUCTION
In 1965,Miller and Lowndespresenteda paper before this group entitled "The
U.S. Air Force WeaponSystemsFatigue Certification Program." (Seeref. 1.) Their
paper described the evolution of the USAF fatigue life requirements up to that time.
One section of the paper listed the aircraft which were considered to be the first line
systems of the USAF in 1965. These aircraft are as follows:
Fighters Bombers Trainers Transport
F-89
F- 100
F-101
F-102
F- 104
F-105
F- 106
B-47
B-52
B-66
T-37
T-38
C-130
C-133
KC-135
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Of these only the following aircraft were committed to a fatigue evaluationprogram:
Fighters Bombers Trainers Transport
F-101
F-104
F- 105
F- 106
B-47
B-52
T-37
T-38
C-130
C-133
KC-135
Five years later, the first line systems of the USAF are as follows:
Fighters Bombers Trainers Transport
F-100
F-105
F-106
F-4
F-5
F-111
A-37
B-52
FB-111
T-37
T-38
C-130
KC-135
C-5
Of these currently operational systems, every one except the F-4 has undergone the
U.S. Air Force fatigue evaluation program. The F-4 was procured by the U.S. Navy and
has not been required to conform to Air Force Aircraft Structural Integrity Program
(ASIP). It is also acknowledged that the F-100 although not originally designed or tested
under any formal program has required several life extensions. Each one has been
approved after additional fatigue testing. It is interesting to note that all aircraft now in
our inventory have undergone a fatigue evaluation program of some kind. This statement
was not true 5 years ago. With this as an introduction, we wish to expand on the USAF's
fatigue evaluation program and how it has changed over the last 5 years.
HISTORY OF STRUCTURAL EVALUATION PROGRAM
1965 to 1968 Period
Figure 1 shows a typical structural evaluation program of the 1965 to 1968 time
period. (Also see refs. 2 and 3.) At that time, ASIP required element and component
tests,but the number and specimen sizes were leftto the contractor's discretion. The
statictest,flightloads survey, and the firstfatiguetestwere run concurrently. After
initialoperational capability(IOC) the program called for service-loads determination fol-
lowed by a second fatigue specimen to be tested to the service-loads spectrum. At that
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time, it appearedto bea goodplan andthe requirements formalizing the program were
written as anASDTechnical Report 66-57 "Air Force Structural Integrity Program
Requirements," datedJanuary 1968(ref. 4) and into various specifications and contracts.
For thoseof youwho are satisfied with your program now,pleasenote that in 1968we
believed that this program was the best in the world. Events proved us to be wrong.
1968to Early 1970Period
In September1968the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Researchand
Development,Dr. Flax, requestedthat a study be performed addressing problems asso-
ciated with structural test program planningandwith schedulingpractices. (This study
is referred to as the Flax study.) Briefly restated, the action items were
(a) Examine current Air Force structural test procedures andpolicies for aircraft
in development.
(b) Assess structural test program schedulingproblems.
(c) Assess past and present structural testing to determine problems or deficiencies
in establishedpolicies andprocedures.
(d) Provide recommendationsto revise present Air Force structural test verifica-
tion practices andpolicies, considering proper balancebetweenprogram risks and costs.
The approachusedin the Flax study was to prepare casehistories of the then cur-
rent systems anda number of typical earlier systems onwhich information was available.
Included in the studywere such dataas original test schedules, the details of static and
fatigue tests, actual start and completion of the tests, and the production rates. The case
histories were carefully studied to establish trends and to identify problem areas. With
these thoughts in mind, let us consider the actual structural program schedules of some
of the Air Force aircraft that were used in the study.
The first aircraft is a large transport, the C-141. Figure 2 shows the schedule.
The C-141 comes as close as any airplane to fulfilling the total ASIP requirements. It
has a static test, structural flight tests, full-scale fatigue tests of two articles, and a life-
history recorder program, the data from which are being used for the second fatigue test.
Figure 2 refers to fatigue test articles A, B, C, D, and E which are shown pictorially in
figure 3.
There were a large number of engineering changes generated by the C-141 fatigue
test program. Most of them were incorporated in production but very late in time. You
can see that there were essentially no component tests. We did a static test and a flight
loads survey almost concurrently as called for by the 1968 ASIP schedule shown earlier,
but the fatigue test was very late in starting. We had aircraft out in the operational fleet
before we had one lifetime on the fatigue test specimen.
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Using hindsight, if wehad started the first fatigue test earlier, we wouldhavebeen
able to incorporate the changesinto earlier production airframes. Instead, we were
unableto get changesinto production earlier than the 200thairframe and weonly had
285airframes in the production contract. The fatigue test article had beenidentified
early enough(it was the seventhairframe), but the actual start of the testing slipped
becauseof managementconsiderations. The lesson learned here was an important one.
If you havea production airframe, get started on the fatigue test as early as possible.
In order to understandmore abouthow the commercial manufacturers designand
build airframes, we will deviate from the Flax study and showyou a comparison we made
betweenthe C-141 and,with the assistance of the BoeingCompany,the Boeing727. We
foundthat Boeinguses a modified form of ASIP. Boeingdoes everything that ASIP
requires, but not in as muchdepthor detail as we in the Air Force do. For example,a
flight loads survey was conductedon the 727becausethe FAA was interested in the T-tail.
Otherwise, the survey would not havebeenflown. Our load survey on the C-141 wasvery
comprehensive.
Let us consider the fatigue tests of the two aircraft. The preparation of the fatigue
spectra for the C-141 was complicatedby the large numberof missions assignedto the
aircraft. Low level penetration, air delivery of cargo andwartime training missions had
to be included in the spectrum. Therefore, the C-141 required abouttwice the fatigue
test segmentsneededfor the 727. The Boeing727hasessentially a single logistic mis-
sion at altitude.
The waywe did our tests comparedwith the way Boeingperformed their fatigue
tests is also very interesting. A list of the fatigue test articles for the 727andthe 747
follow:
727and 747noselanding gear
Main landinggear
Airframe
Wing
Fuselage
Vertical tail
Horizontal tail
Control surfaces
The horizontal tail was a separatetest specimenfor the 747. You havealready seen
those for the C-141fatigue test specimenin figure 3. We choseto break the airframe
up into componentsso that a failure on onespecimenwill not causean interruption to
the others. This methodis more expensivethan the methodused by Boeingbut it is
less risky.
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Figure 4 is a direct comparisonbetweenthe test schedulesof the C-141 and the
727. The differences in magnitudeof the scopeof the tests are significant. Our static
test took longer becauseof downtime anda needto retest the wing after uncovering a
different load distribution than expectedduring the flight loads survey. Our fatigue test
also took longer becauseof the multimission requirement of the C-141. The major dif-
ferences betweenBoeing tests andthe USAFtests are as follows:
13missions C-141
1 mission 727
Boeingtests wholestructure
USAFtest major components
Boeingperforms modestflight loads survey
USAFperforms full flight loads survey
Nowlet us consider another Air Force aircraft test program, that for the F-5
(fig. 5). This program was successful for two reasons: First, the F-5 airframe was
essentially the same as that of the T-38 and the Norair N-156which hadundergonean
extensivestructural evaluationprogram. Secondly,the items that were changedon the
F-5 from the T-38 were tested as componentsduring the designdevelopmenttesting phase
of the program. The primary difference betweenthe T-38 and the F-5 was, of course,
that the T-38 wasa trainer type aircraft designedfor the training environment, whereas
the F-5 was a fighter type with external stores andtip tanks, leading-edge flaps, and drag
chute; the F-5 was also designedfor the close groundsupport fighter environment. This
type of redesign readily lends itself to verification of structural adequacyby utilizing
small componentsor element testing. In the developmentof the F-5, it it hadnot had
the T-38 as a predecessor, the componenttests would havebeenrequired.
It shouldbe notedthat the service-loads--life-history phasewas limited on the
F-5 evaluation. It started late andwas stoppedmuch too early. If a continuousprogram
hadbeenaccomplished, the loss of an F-5 at Williams Air Force Base in early 1970
might have beenaverted. At Williams AFB, training is conductedfor Military Assistance
Program (MAP) pilots. During this training a large number of 2g to 3g maneuversare
accomplished. The fatigue damageaccumulatedfrom this training is muchgreater than
the averagedamageaccumulation anda fatigue crack developedin the center wing lower
skin that causedthe loss of pilot andaircraft. This fatigue critical area hadbeendetected
in the full-scale fatigue test. Hadanadequateservice-loads or life-history program been
in being, the damageaccumulationshouldhavebeendetected andan adequateinspection
program could have anticipated the needfor repair.
The timing of the full-scale fatigue test also could standsome improvement in that
it could have started sooner. Again, the previous T-38 tests alongwith the F-5 develop-
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ment tests minimized the impact of the later start anddid allow the useof a truly produc-
tion configuration for the full-scale fatigue test.
Outof the Flax study camesomevery significant recommendations:
(a) Continueearly static andfatigue tests
(b) Emphasizecomponenttests
(c) Establish firm policy on structural integrity program
(d) Perform cost effectiveness studies during contract definition phasebetween
developmentalandproduction testing andbetweenproduction build-up andstructural
retrofit. These recommendationswere acceptedandwe revised our ASIP requirements
documentASDTR 66-57 (ref. 5). It was published in May 1970andmanyof youare famil-
iar with it.
Nowwe want to discuss the present ASIPschedule,the onecalled for by the 1970
version of ASDTR 66-57. Before doing that, let us agree on somedefinitions of element
tests, design-developmenttests, preproduction designverification tests, and full-scale
tests. Element tests involve relatively small parts of the structure, joints, small panels,
or stringer to frame splices. Theseare very small pieces but, as you know,extremely
important to the structure. Designdevelopmentandpreproduction designverification
tests consist of those tests of materials, structural elements, andstructural components
performed early in the designphaseto provide a realistic basis for the designanalysis
andmajor structural ground tests. The designdevelopmenttests are the most basic and
earliest tests andare conductedto establish basic design conceptsandconfigurations
suchas choiceof materials, panel sizes, splices, fittings, etc. Preproduction design
verification (PDV) tests are conductedafter the designdevelopmenttests, but prior to
the full-scale static andfatigue tests. These tests of full-scale components(wing carry
through, wing pivots, horizontal-tail support, etc.) are conductedto provide early design
information wherever analytical methodsmay be inadequateto achievea high degreeof
confidencein the strength andfatigue properties of the design. These tests are intended
to reveal design "glitches" prior to the full-scale ground tests.
With these thoughtsas background,let us consider our present ASIP schedule. It
is representative of the program now beingusedon the F-15 andprovided the original
schemefor the B-1 (fig. 6). It requires that the contractor conductearly preproduction
designverification componenttests of major assemblies. It also requires two full-scale
fatigue tests, the first as early as possible and concurrent with the static test andthe
flight loads survey. After IOC it requires a service-loads program to obtain the spectrum
for the secondfatigue test.
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1970to Present
Thus far we havetraced the changesto the ASIP fatigue evaluation program from
1965to 1970. Thenwe had somestructural problems which focusednational attention on
the structural integrity of someof our systems, notably the F-111 andthe C-5.
At the direction of Secretary of the Air Force, Seamans,a group of experts was
formed to look into the problems wewere havingor might have in the future. There fol-
loweda year and a half of study, reappraisal, reviews, audits, and anoverall reevalua-
tion of ASIPand its requirements.
Onephaseof the structural integrity review involved a trip to Europe. The authors
had anopportunity to visit someof you in your home countries of France, Holland, and
England. Welearned quite a bit from our discussions with you andhave since been
involved in various meetingsand conferenceson ASIP.
We hadthoughtof ASIPas a logical, step-by-step program, which, if followed,
would insure a structurally soundairplane. But wewere mistaken, those of you in
Europe seemto be able to designandbuild soundairframes without a formal structural
integrity program suchas ASIP. Moreover, we foundthat ASIPas applied to programs
here in the U.S. sometimes worked andsometimes it did not. The primary variable
seemedto be the contractor or perhaps the type of contract andnot ASIP itself. Thus,
our experiencehas shownthat the structural quality of an airplane is a function of who
designs it andhowhe designsand builds it. It has hadlittle to do with the ASIPdocu-
mentation. This may be anoversimplification of the situation we face in the Air Force
today. We realize that our treatment so far has not addressedthe basic questionof '_Do
we really needan ASIPat all?" Evenso, permit me to pursue a line of reasoning based
on the following premises:
(a) ASIP shouldbe effective regardless of the contractor or the contract selected.
(b) It is not.
(c) Therefore, ASIPshouldbe changed.
As a result of recent systems' experience, structural developmentcost restraints,
anda review of international structural test practices, the Air Force is proposing a
structural development test program that is different from that used before. The signifi-
cant change is in the method of fatigue evaluation, as you will notice (fig. 7). The pre-
production tests of major assemblies and the early fatigue tests now required seem to be
duplicative efforts rather than what is desired. The preproduction tests should identify
deficiencies that can be corrected in time for validation on the early full-scale fatigue
test.
In the proposed program, design development and preproduction design verification
(PDV) tests that are more extensive than those originally identified by the USAF in 1970
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are envisioned. The very early componenttests must nowprovide for completestruc-
tural evaluation (strength, fatigue, fracture) of the major critical areas of the primary
structure. This is necessary (mandatory, even)inasmuchas thesecomponenttests are
to be the main basis for determining adequacyof the design, proof of compliance, and
even early life flight safety since the full-scale fatigue test will be delayedunder this
proposal. The PDV tests must be comprehensive. Note that this requirement is an
intrinsic part of the proposedprogram.
The important schedulingof the full-scale static test andthe flight loads measure-
mentprogram retain their original timing. These tests are to coincide with the delivery
of the first flight article andare to receive equalpriority with other subsystemevaluation
requirements.
The major changethat weare proposingfocuseson the full-scale fatigue test.
Until nowwe haveidentified, in the initial system plans, a requirement for two full-scale
fatigue tests, one strictly an early designevaluationtest andthe other a delayedtest
(approximately two or more years after initial operational capability) that utilized the
results of the earlier designevaluationtests (static test, fatigue test, andflight loads
survey). This late fatigue test wasalso intendedto be delayeduntil completion of the
service-loads recording program so that accurate service environment data wouldbe
available. However, evenwhenfaced with the real-world past experiencethat all first
line military aircraft systems (especially fighters) eventually undergomore thanone
full-scale fatigue test, USAFmanagementwasunwilling to identify funds for two full-
scale fatigue tests during initial program definition.
Recognizingthis situation andthe increased emphasisthat we are placing on early
componentPDV testing andthe desire to make the PDV tests effectively impact the design
phaseas well as the full-scale testing, we are proposing to identify a single fatigue test
which will beconductedlater than the first test and earlier than the secondtest previously
required. This revised schedulingof the single full-scale fatigue test is necessary so that
it will incorporate the findings of the PDV tests, static test, and the flight loads survey.
In all probability, it will not be delayeda sufficient amountof time to use the results of
the service-loads recording program.
Finally, we recognize, andeveryoneelse shouldalso, that additional laboratory
tests (evenflight tests) may be required as extensiveservice experienceis accumulated.
However, noattempt will be madeto identify anyadditional test requirements in the orig-
inal developmentprocess.
There are definite critical control points in our proposedprogram that must con-
stantly be reviewed as newsystems are developed. There are also some important
questions that must be answered:
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(1) Can the structures discipline effectively divert major airframe components
from the ever present push to get a flight article as early as possible? Our proposed
fatigue evaluation program has as its very foundation a comprehensive PDV test pro-
gram that will require major structural components early enough to complete the tests
before flight articles are produced. Can we win out against the competition and acquire
these early components in time for the structural evaluation?
(2) The full-scale fatigue test can no longer be used as contractual proof that the
design fatigue life requirements have been met. The test will now be based on results of
earlier design and test information that cannot be accurately foreseen. Demonstration of
structural fatigue quality assurance requirements must utilize the PDV tests.
(3) USAF management must be aware that major changes in the aircraft structure
or mission may require further validation. Also, further validation may be required if
the single fatigue test did not contain inputs that are representative of the service envi-
ronment for the original design missions.
We have outlined the proposed changes that the U.S. Air Force is planning in the
fatigue evaluation program for future systems. These changes are planned to be incor-
porated into a revision of both the technical report ASD TR 66-57, dated May 1970, and
the appropriate Structures Military Specifications, commonly referred to as the 8860
series specifications.
UPDATING OF SPECIFICATIONS
MIL-A-8860 Specifications
To conclude our treatment of the proposed fatigue evaluation program, it may be
useful to review our recent progress in updating the MIL-A-8860 specifications. As a
result of the Seamans' study, it was suggested that our organization (Aeronautical Systems
Division) have the prime responsibility for the documents. Previously, the responsibility
rested with the Flight Dynamics Laboratory. We propose to cover some of the significant
changes we are making in three selected specifications as well as in the ASD TR 66-57.
The revision of the technical report ASD TR 66-57 will convert the format of the
report from an ASD TR to a MIL-STD-(USAF). In addition to the fatigue evaluation
changes just discussed, it is planned to include in the revised MIL-STD new or increased
emphasis on materials selection, fracture mechanics requirements, and damage tolerance
design.
The addition of the requirements for materials selection are presently being written.
The area of fracture mechanics principles is, of course, directly related to materials
selection and some of the research work being accomplished in this area is the subject of
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a paper by HowardA. Wood,of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (paper no. 14
of this compilation).
In the area of damage tolerance design requirements, we have made some progress
in updating our requirements. Since the new MIL-STD will only summarize the damage
tolerance requirements that are contained in the MIL-A-8860 series specifications, our
initial effort has been concentrated on revising these specifications. In an attempt to
expedite the revision, the Air Force elected to revise and publish "USAF only" revisions.
These limited coordinated (USAF only) military specifications have been prepared by using
currently available technical information, but they have not been approved for promulga-
tion as a fully coordinated (USAF, Navy, 'and Army) revision of military specifications.
They are subject to modification. Pending their promulgation as fully coordinated mili-
tary specifications, they may be used in procurement (USAF). The damage tolerance
design requirements contained in these revised specifications are covered in the following
sections.
Damage Tolerance Requirements for Inclusion in MIL-A-008860A (USAF)
The primary structure shall incorporate materials, stress levels, and structural
configurations which will minimize the probability of loss of the aircraft due to propaga-
tion of undetected flaws, cracks, or other damage. Slow crack growth, alternate load-
paths and systems, and other available principles shall be employed to achieve this cap-
ability. For this damage tolerance requirement, the primary structure is defined as
including all structural elements the failure of which will
(a) Cause uncontrollable motions of the aircraft within the speed limits for its
structural design
(b) Prevent an aircraft from achieving speeds sufficiently low to effect a safe
landing
(c) Reduce the ultimate factor of safety for flight design conditions from 1.5 to a
value less than 1.0.
Damage Tolerance Requirements for Inclusion in MIL-A-008866A (USAF)
General requirements.- Safe-life design shall be employed as the primary means of
satisfying the specified service life requirement established in appropriate contractual
documents for each USAF aircraft system. In addition, damage tolerance concepts shall
be applied as a design requirement for primary structure vital to the integrity of the
vehicle or the safety of personnel. This latter requirement stems from the recognition
that, despite concerted safe-life-insurance efforts through design, analyses, and tests,
undetected flaws or damage can exist in critical structural components at some time dur-
ing the life of the aircraft with attendant, serious consequences.
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Safe life.- The fatigue critical areas of the airframe shall be identified through
analyses and tests (developmental, preproduction component, and full-scale article). The
structure shall be shown to withstand, without structural failure, the design repeated
loads spectrum equal to the design fatigue-scatter factor times the service-loads spectrum.
A service-loads spectrum is defined for one lifetime only and does not include a design
fatigue-scatter factor. Modifications found necessary to satisfy this requirement shall be
incorporated prior to aircraft delivery or by retrofit in fleet aircraft as agreed to by the
procuring agency.
Design fatigue-scatter factor.- The design fatigue-scatter factor is a factor to pro-
vide protection against fatigue failure of those fleet airplanes that experience a service-
loads spectrum more severe than the design service-loads spectrum and have fatigue-life
capabilities less than those of laboratory test articles. The design fatigue-scatter factor
shall be a minimum of 4.0 or as otherwise approved by the procuring activity.
Service-loads spectrum.- The service-loads spectrum is derived from a collection
of loads spectra. Each loads spectrum in this collection shall define the expected (aver-
age) number of load cycles according to load magnitude for a given source of repeated
loads. The loads spectrum for each significant source of repeated loads shall be based
on a realistic interpretation of the design usage. The contractor shall include all signifi-
cant sources of repeated loads. The sources of repeated loads may include, but not be
limited to, ground handling and taxiing operations, landing operations, flight maneuvers,
atmospheric turbulence, in.flight refueling, autopilot, inputs, cabin pressurization, buffet-
ing, terrain-following maneuvers, and the ground-air-ground cycle.
Damage tolerance.- The primary structure vital to the integrity of the vehicle or to
the safety of personnel shall incorporate materials, stress levels, and structural configu-
rations which minimize the probability of structural failure due to the propagation of
undetected flaws, cracks, or other damage. The choice of damage-tolerant design con-
cepts (fail safe, safe crack growth, or combinations thereof) for the design of specific
critical structural components shall be as agreed between the procuring agency and the
contractor. Analysis and supporting tests shall be conducted to evaluate the flaw growth
and residual strength characteristics of the critical structural components.
Fail safe.- Primary structure that is designed fail safe shall be readily inspectable
and meet the following requirements after failure of a principal structural element:
(1) the remaining structure shall sustain without failure the maximum expected load or
limit load, whichever is greater, (2) the airplane shall be controllable within the design
speed limits, and (3) catastrophic failure of the remaining structure will not occur under
repeated load conditions during the period to the next opportunity to detect the failure.
Verification of the ability of the remaining structure to withstand the repeated loads shall
be accomplished by determining the crack growth period from an initial flaw to failure of
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a principal element, andthen ensuring that the life (including the factor of four) of the
remaining structure will equalor exceedthe time interval establishedfor the next inspec-
tion. Inspection intervals shall be as agreed to by the procuring agency,but, in general,
these intervals shall be of reasonableduration commensuratewith total system require-
ments. Readily inspectable structure is definedas that which canbe inspectedafter
removal of accesspanels, doors, etc. Removalof permanenttype skins andfasteners
is not included. The details of inspection shall be agreeduponby the procuring agency
andthe contractor.
Safe crack growth.- Critical primary structure that is not fail safe shall be designed
so that initial flaws will not propagate to the critical crack length during the specified ser-
vice life of the airplane. Through fracture data tests and analysis, the characteristics
and dimensions of the smallest initial defect that could grow to critical size during the
specified service life shall be determined. Once these initial flaw sizes have been identi-
fied, quality control procedures shall be developed so that parts containing initial flaws of
these dimensions will not be accepted. In the event that the identified initial flaw sizes
are smaller than the quality control detection capability, changes shall be made in the
materials and/or stress levels so that larger initial flaws (compatible with quality control
capability) can be tolerated.
Damage-Tolerance Test Requirements for Inclusion in MIL-A-008867A (USAF)
Fracture data tests.- Fracture data shall be generated during the design develop-
ment test phase on all candidate materials for which no valid data base exists to support
the analysis requirements. These tests shall include plane strain and plane stress tests
to determine fracture toughness values as well as crack propagation tests to determine
incremental crack extension rates. These data shall be used for comparative evaluation
of proposed materials and designs. Fracture toughness values shall be determined in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the current standards. Specifications shall be
prepared to ensure that materials having minimum guaranteed fracture-toughness param-
eter (K1c / values are used in manufacture where test specimens having dimensions that
satisfy ASTM requirements can be obtained. Continued sampling of final manufactured
parts shall be accomplished throughout the production life to ensure consistency with the
required strength and toughness levels.
Crack propagation tests shall be conducted on element specimens to determine the
conventional cyclic crack growth rate and sustained load growth rate data. These tests
shall include the evaluation of the effects of various atmospheric environments (such as
temperature, humidity, fuel, salt, etc.). Spectrum tests of flawed specimens shall also be
conducted when insufficient data exists or when proven analytical capability to predict
spectrum effects is lacking.
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Crack growth tests.- Crack growth tests of preproduction components shall be con-
ducted as required to verify that the damage tolerance criteria have been met. These
tests shall be accomplished by applying a spectrum of loads and environment that simu-
lates operational usage which will determine the time to crack initiation and the time to
failure of a single principal element. These tests shall utilize, wherever possible, the
existing component structures fabricated for evaluation of the strength and fatigue proper-
ties as an "add-on" test effort. When necessary, additional component structures shall
be fabricated.
The revised structural specifications are as follows:
Specification number
MIL-A-008860A (USAF)
MIL-A-008861A
MIL-A-008862A
MIL-A-008865A
MIL-A-008866A
MIL-A-008867A
MIL-A-008869A
(USAF)
(USAF)
(USAF)
(USAF)
(USAF)
(USAF)
MIL-A-008870A (USAF)
MIL-A-8871A (USAF)
MIL-A-8892A (USAF)
MIL-A-8893A (USAF)
Short title
General
Flight loads
Ground loads
Miscellaneous loads
Fatigue
Ground tests
Nuclear
Flutter
Flight test
Vibration
Sonic fatigue
These specifications listed are dated 31 March 1971 and are presently in printing; the
estimated distribution date is July 1971. The MIL-A-008860A, 61A, 62A, 65A, 67A, 69A,
and 70A are former ASG (joint) specifications which have been revised as USAF only
specifications. MIL-A-008871A has always been a USAF only specification. MIL-A-8892
and MIL-A-8893 are new specifications which apply to USAF only.
The next two major efforts that are presently being accomplished are, revision of
ASD TR 66-57 into a MIL-STD, and full coordination on the revised specification will
result in ASG type specifications.
C ONC LUDING RE MARKS
We are proposing the elimination of one full-scale fatigue test article and replacing
it with early full-scale component tests. The full-scale fatigue test is performed later
than present requirements state but earlier than the previously required second fatigue
test. To formalize this change in the fatigue evaluation program, we are revising the
8860 series of specifications and writing the USAF ASIP into a separate Military Standard.
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in preparing this paper.
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